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A learning test procedure based on operant principles may be useful in the diagnosis (and
eventually rehabilitation) of post-coma persons with minimal responsiveness. This study
was aimed at extending the evaluation of such a procedure with seven participants who
presented with very limited behavior and apparently severe disorders of consciousness.
The procedure was evaluated through an ABACB design, in which A represented baseline
phaseswithout stimulation, B intervention phaseswith brief stimulation periods contingent
on speciﬁc responses of the participants, and C a control phase in which stimulation was
available all the time. Increased responding during the B phases, as opposed to the A
and C phases, was taken to indicate learning and possibly a non-reﬂective expression of
phenomenal consciousness. All participants were also evaluated with the coma recovery
scale-revised (CRS-R) prior to the start of the learning test procedure and at the end of it.The
results of the learning test showed that all participants had signiﬁcantly higher responding
levels during the B phases.The CRS-R scores suggested minimally conscious state for four
of them prior to the learning test and for ﬁve of them after the completion of the learning
test. The implications of the ﬁndings are discussed in terms of potential and time cost of
the learning test.
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INTRODUCTION
Post-coma persons with extensive brain damage and minimal (or
no apparent) responsiveness may present serious questions con-
cerning the diagnosis of their state as well as the identiﬁcation
of the most suitable intervention strategy to promote their adap-
tive behavior (Lancioni et al., 2010a; Bruno et al., 2011; Gosseries
et al., 2011; Fingelkurts et al., 2012, 2013; Laureys and Boly, 2012;
Schnakers, 2012). Behavioral scales apparently represent the most
frequently used tools for determining the persons’ general status
and monitoring or predicting their possible progress (Cavinato
et al., 2009; Whyte et al., 2009; Amantini et al., 2011; Lechinger
et al., 2013; Ní Lochlainn et al., 2013). Behavioral scales, such as the
coma recovery scale-revised (CRS-R) and the Wessex head injury
matrix (WHIM), involve detailed assessment conditions that are
considered adequate to identify relevant sensory and communica-
tion expressions or responses to objects easily missed in traditional
bedside evaluations (Shiel et al., 2000; Kalmar and Giacino, 2005;
Schnakers et al., 2009; Boly, 2011; Bruno et al., 2011; Doig and
Lane-Brown, 2012; Godbolt et al., 2012; La Porta et al., 2013).
Neurophysiological strategies for assessing event-related brain
potentials (P300 andmismatch negativity) are also frequently used
with persons with severe disorders of consciousness, particularly
persons with extensive levels of impairment and minimal (or no
apparent) responsiveness (Fischer et al., 2008, 2010; Qin et al.,
2008; Cavinato et al., 2009; Höller et al., 2011; Lehembre et al.,
2012; King et al., 2013). The presence of recognizable P300 and
mismatch negativity responses has been generally taken as a posi-
tive sign that attests to or predicts an evolution towards basic levels
of awareness/consciousness (Wijnen et al., 2007; Vanhaudenhuyse
et al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2010).
The use of neuroimaging techniques, such as functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI), represents the most sophisticated
approach to enhance the assessment in cases of minimal (or no
apparent) responsiveness (Owen and Coleman, 2008; Coleman
and Pickard, 2011; Monti, 2012; Bodart et al., 2013; Harrison and
Connolly, 2013; Owen, 2013). Such an approach has been instru-
mental to reach diagnostic answers for a number of controversial
cases (e.g., Owen et al., 2006; Monti et al., 2010). It must also
be pointed out, however, that its application can be a difﬁcult
methodological and practical challenge in most medical and care
or rehabilitation contexts (Vul and Pashler, 2012; Harrison and
Connolly, 2013; Mashour and Avidan, 2013).
Another approach for extending/enhancing the assessment
of difﬁcult cases might be the use of learning test procedures
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(Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Lancioni et al., 2009a; Kim et al., 2012;
Monti, 2012). Two types of procedures have been reported as
potentially successful tools. One was based on classical learning
principles (Pierce and Cheney, 2008) and assessed the persons’
responding (i.e., eyelid closure) to a sound stimulus, which
was paired with an air-puff (Bekinschtein et al., 2009). Learning
consisted of responding immediately after the sound and indepen-
dently of the air-puff. The other was based on operant learning
principles (Pierce and Cheney, 2008) and assessed the persons’
frequency of a simple response (e.g., prolonged eyelid closure),
which was followed by brief periods of positive environmental
stimuli such as music. Learning consisted of an increase in the
frequency of the response leading to stimulation (i.e., of an associ-
ation between the response and the consequent stimulation). Signs
of learning in each of the two procedures would (a) indicate an
association between events (i.e., the speciﬁc sound and the air-puff
in the ﬁrst case and the response and the following stimulation in
the second case), and (b) probably suggest a non-reﬂective level
of phenomenal consciousness that could support a diagnosis of
minimally conscious state (Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Bosco et al.,
2009, 2010; Lancioni et al., 2009b, 2011).
In light of the above, the learning test procedures might be
pointed out as an important aspect/supplement in the diagnos-
tic process. The second (operant learning) procedure might have
the relevant advantage of being suitable for rehabilitation inter-
vention also (Machado and Korein, 2009; Lancioni et al., 2010a,
2012b). In fact, it might help the persons become more active
(i.e., increase the frequency of the responses selected for them) to
access their environment, enhance their level of sensory input, and
show their preference for different stimuli and caregivers (Lancioni
et al., 2010a, 2012b; Bagnato et al., 2013). The present study was
aimed at providing conﬁrmatory evidence on the applicability and
impact/potential of the second procedurewith a new group of par-
ticipants that included seven post-coma persons with very limited
behavior and apparently severe disorders of consciousness. All par-
ticipants were evaluatedwith the CRS-R (i.e., themost widely used
behavioral scale) prior to the start of the learning test procedure
and at the end of it.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The seven participants included two women (Carol and Doris)
and ﬁve men (Alex, David, Neal, Damon, and Ray) who were in
a neurological rehabilitation center or in medical care centers and
presented with disorders of consciousness and pervasive motor
impairment secondary to brain injury and coma. All participants
also used a gastrostomy tube for enteral nutrition. Their families
had provided informed consent for this study, whichwas approved
by a scientiﬁc and ethics committee. Carol was 71 years old and
had suffered a cardiac arrest with subsequent anoxic encephalopa-
thy about 8 months prior to this study. Her coma lasted 4 weeks
and then developed into a vegetative state, which had reportedly
changed only minimally over time. Her CRS-R total score at the
start of the learning test procedure was 7 (see Table 1 for the scores
on the subscales).
Doris was 82 years old and had suffered aneurism rupture of
the anterior communicating artery, with extended subarachnoid
hemorrhage and coma about 4 months prior to this study. Angio-
graphic arterial embolization was carried out with her. Her coma
lasted 2 weeks and was replaced by a condition, which was soon
considered compatible with the minimally conscious state. Her
CRS-R total score at the start of the learning test procedure was 9
(see Table 1).
Alex was 34 years old, and had been involved in a road accident
about 12 years prior to this study. The accident had resulted in
diffuse axonal injury on bilateral temporal areas, right fronto-
temporal region, and splenium of corpus callosum. His coma
lasted 3 weeks and then developed into a vegetative state, which
improved, over an unspeciﬁed time period, to a level compatible
with the minimally conscious state. His CRS-R total score at the
start of the learning test procedure was 12 (see Table 1).
David was 72 years old, and had suffered a left total anterior
circulation stroke about 10 months prior to the study, with conse-
quent left fronto-temporoparietal ischemic lesion. His coma lasted
about 2weeks and evolved into a vegetative state. Thiswas reported
to have apparently changed into a minimally conscious state about
2 months thereafter. His CRS-R total score at the start of the
learning test procedure was 7 (see Table 1).
Neal was 27 years old and had suffered a severe fall about
5 months prior to the study. The fall had resulted in multiple
cranial fractures with extended right hemispheric subarachnoid
hemorrhage, right temporal subdural hematoma, and diffuse
axonal injury of the right fronto-temporal region and splenium of
corpus callosum. His coma lasted 3 weeks and then developed into
a vegetative state, which lasted about 3 months and was apparently
replaced by a minimally conscious state. His CRS-R total score at
the start of the learning test procedure was 10 (see Table 1).
Table 1 | Participants’ scores on the first (upper number) and second
(lower number) application of the CRS-R.
Subscales Participants
Carol Doris Alex David Neal Damon Ray
Arousal 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Oral/motor 1 1 2 0 1 0 0
1 1 2 0 1 0 0
Motor 2 2 5 1 3 1 2
2 2 5 1 5 2 2
Communication 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Visual 1 2 1 2 2 1 1
2 3 1 2 3 1 1
Auditory 1 2 2 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 1 1
Total score 7 9 12 7 10 5 5
9 10 12 8 13 6 6
Bold scores indicate minimally conscious state.
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Damon was 43 years old, and had been involved in a road acci-
dent resulting in extended brain damage about 3 months prior
to this study. He presented with diffuse axonal injury of the genu,
body and spleniumof corpus callosum, andmesencephalic region.
His coma lasted 3 weeks and developed into a vegetative state
that reportedly improved only with regard to the level of vigi-
lance/alertness prior to the study. His CRS-R total score at the
start of the learning test procedure was 5 (see Table 1).
Ray was 49 years old, and had suffered an extended
left temporoparietal and ventricular hemorrhage with conse-
quent hematoma about 6 months prior to this study. Fol-
lowing hematoma evacuation, he presented with a diffuse left
fronto-temporoparietal necrotic lesion and hydrocephalus. Ray’s
coma lasted about 4 weeks and was replaced by a vegetative
state, which showed limited evolution over time. His CRS-R
total score at the start of the learning test procedure was 5
(see Table 1).
RESPONSES, MICROSWITCHES, AND STIMULI
During the sessions, Carol, Alex, David, Damon, and Ray lay in
bed while Doris and Neal were either in bed or in a reclined posi-
tion in a wheelchair. The responses were selected on the basis
of their apparent suitability and ease (i.e., after direct and video
observation of the participants’ repertoire). They consisted of (a)
simple eyelid closure for David, (b) prolonged eyelid closure (i.e.,
a closure exceeding 0.5 s) for Carol and Alex, (c) repeated eye-
lid closure (i.e., two blinks within a 2-s interval) for Doris, (d)
ﬁnger raising movement (i.e., a movement of the index ﬁnger
from the right hand) for Neal, (e) movement of the thumb toward
the index ﬁnger for Damon, and (f) forehead skin movement for
Ray. The microswitch used for the eyelid closure responses was
an optic sensor including an infrared light-emitting diode and
a mini infrared-light detection unit (see Lancioni et al., 2012a).
The microswitch was held through medical tape slightly above
the participants’ right or left cheekbone (i.e., sufﬁciently distant
from the eye so that it would not interfere with normal visual
functioning). To ensure that the microswitch would detect eyelid
closures, a small paper sticker was attached to the participants’ cor-
responding eyelid (Lancioni et al., 2012c). An optic microswitch
was also used for Neal and Ray. For Neal, it was arranged slightly
above the index ﬁnger of his right hand and was activated when-
ever the ﬁnger was raised (i.e., moved close to the microswitch).
For Ray, it was attached to the forehead, together with a black
mini sticker, and was activated as the forehead skin moved upward
(i.e., as the microswitch pointing shifted from the sticker to the
skin; Lancioni et al., 2013). A two-membrane small device was
attached to the index ﬁnger of Damon’s right hand. It was acti-
vated via a small contact or pressure of the thumb (Lancioni et al.,
2012a).
Microswitch activation triggered a computer system that
activated a 10-s presentation of stimuli considered to be rel-
evant/pleasant for the participants. The stimuli consisted of
audio-visual inputs, namely, video clips of singing, comedy, ﬁlms,
and family events, which had been recommended by the partici-
pants’ families as preferred for the participants prior to their brain
injury and coma. For Ray, who was reported to have unspeciﬁed
visual and auditory impairment, video clips were combined with
light body massages, namely, light stroking of his shoulders, arms,
hands, and chest.
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS
The learning test procedure was carried out according to an
ABACB sequence (a new A would be used after the C if this pro-
duced high responding, but such an event did not occur; Barlow
et al., 2009). A represented baseline, B contingent stimulation, and
C non-contingent stimulation. Sessions lasted 5 min and were
implemented 4–11 times a day, depending on the participants’
schedule and wakefulness (i.e., a session was carried out only if the
participant was awake). The test was completed in approximately
4 weeks. Prior to the beginning of the ﬁrst A phase and after the
completion of the second B phase, the participants were assessed
through the CRS-R.
Data collection during the learning test consisted of record-
ing the frequencies of the participants’ microswitch responses.
Such recording was automatically carried out through the com-
puter system. A new response would be recorded only if it
occurred after an interval of 10 s from the previous one (i.e.,
after an interval equivalent to that covered by contingent stim-
ulation episodes during the B phases). Response prompting (i.e.,
an air puff on the forehead or a tap on the ﬁnger) was available
prior to the start of the sessions as well as during the sessions if
periods of non-responding of 30–60 s occurred. The responses
performed during the sessions through prompting were sub-
tracted from the computer count (i.e., by the researchers in charge
of the sessions). Agreement between researchers on recording
these prompt-related responses (which could also be zero) was
checked in 8–10 sessions for each participant and reported to be
consistent.
Baseline (A) phases
During these phases, the participants were provided with their
microswitch and the computer system. Responding was recorded,
but no stimulation was available during the sessions. The baseline
phases included four to eight sessions and ended if the response
frequency of the last session was in line with or lower than that of
the previous sessions.
Contingent stimulation (B) phases
Conditions were as in baseline except that stimulation (i.e.,
presentation of selected stimuli) occurred contingent on the
participants’ responses. Each responsewas followed by a 10-s stim-
ulation period. The two B phases included 45 and 30 sessions,
respectively.
Non-contingent stimulation (C) phase
Conditions were as in the B phases except that stimulation (i.e.,
presentation of selected stimuli) occurred throughout the session.
Thirty sessions were implemented.
Applications of the CRS-R
The CRS-R was applied prior to the start of the learning test pro-
cedure and at the end of it. The same two experts were responsible
for the application of the scale and simultaneously present during
the evaluations. The scoring was done on a consensus basis.
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RESULTS
Theparticipants’ frequencies of responses independent of prompts
during the learning test (i.e., during the A, B, and C phases of
the study) are summarized in Figures 1–7, respectively. The bars
used within the ﬁgures represent mean frequencies of responses,
per session, over blocks of sessions. The blocks include four to
eight sessions during the baseline phases, 15 sessions during the
ﬁrst B phase, and 10 sessions during the C phase and the sec-
ond B phase. Carol’s baseline phases showed mean frequencies of
about ﬁve and six responses per session, respectively (Figure 1).
Her two B phases showed mean frequencies of about 13 and 17
responses per session, respectively. Her non-contingent stimula-
tion (C) phase showed a mean frequency of about ﬁve responses
per session.
Doris’ baseline mean frequencies were below ﬁve per session
(Figure 2). Her mean frequencies during the B phases exceeded 10
and 14 per session. Her mean frequency during the C phase was
below four per session. Alex’s data were similar to those of Doris
except for a slightly higher response frequency during the C phase
(Figure 3). Neal’s data (Figure 5) were similar to those observed
for Carol.
David’s baseline mean frequencies of responses were about
eight per session (Figure 4). His mean frequencies during the B
phases were about 17 and 18 per session. His mean frequency
during the C phase was below 10 per session. Damon’s mean
frequencies of responses per session were below ﬁve during the
baseline phases, about 10 during the B phases, and again below
ﬁve during the C phase (Figure 6). Finally, Ray’s mean frequencies
per session were below four and two during the baseline phases,
near seven and eight during the B phases, and about two during
the C phase (Figure 7).
The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (Siegel and Castellan, 1988)
showed that the differences between the response frequencies of
theA and B phases as well as of the B andCphases were statistically
signiﬁcant (p< 0.01) for all participants. These differences suggest
that all participants showed signs of learning. Those signs might
be taken to indicate some form of consciousness as suggested in
the Section “Introduction.”
Table 1 reports the participants’ scores on the single subscales
of the CRS-R and their total scores during the ﬁrst (upper num-
bers) and the second (lower numbers) application of the scale.
The scores of the ﬁrst evaluation suggest a diagnosis of (a) min-
imally conscious state for Doris, Alex, Neal, and David, and (b)
vegetative state for Carol, Damon, and Ray. The scores of the sec-
ond evaluation suggest a diagnosis of minimally conscious state
for the four participants mentioned above and for Carol (due to
her improvement in the visual subscale), and vegetative state for
Damon and Ray. The data of the second CRS-R application indi-
cate conformity with the learning test data of ﬁve of the seven
participants.
FIGURE 1 | Carol’s data during the different phases of the learning test.The bars represent mean frequencies of responses per session over blocks of
sessions. The blocks include six and eight sessions during the baseline phases, 15 sessions during the ﬁrst B phase, and 10 sessions during the C phase and
the second B phase.
FIGURE 2 | Doris’ data plotted as in Figure 1 with variations on the number of baseline sessions (see text).
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FIGURE 3 | Alex’s data plotted as in Figure 2.
FIGURE 4 | David’s data plotted as in Figure 2.
FIGURE 5 | Neal’s data plotted as in Figure 2.
FIGURE 6 | Damon’s data plotted as in Figure 2.
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FIGURE 7 | Ray’s data plotted as in Figure 2.
DISCUSSION
A learning test procedure relying on several speciﬁc responses,
microswitches, and stimuli were effectively used with seven par-
ticipants who displayed severe disorders of consciousness. The
fact that learning was also visible with Damon and Ray whose
CRS-R evaluations showed scores compatible with a diagnosis of
vegetative state may be practically relevant. In fact, the learning
test may be more sensitive than behavioral scales and help iden-
tify signs of consciousness when the general (sensory, motor, and
communication) behaviors tapped by the scales do not yet suggest
the presence of those signs. It might be that the CRS-R scores of
those individuals increase over time and eventually get to match
the learning evidence. Score increases and correspondence with
the learning data, however, might not necessarily be expected in
all cases (especially those with pervasive motor impairment or
sensory disabilities; see Lancioni et al., 2010a).
The question of whether the learning evidence can be taken
as a sign of consciousness has been tackled in previous stud-
ies (Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Bosco et al., 2009, 2010; Lancioni
et al., 2009b, 2011). Their basic point has been that learning
may be considered a non-reﬂective expression of phenomenal
consciousness and, therefore, might support a diagnosis of min-
imally conscious state. Indeed, learning reﬂects the participant’s
ability (a) to monitor/discriminate a speciﬁc response and the
occurrence of environmental stimuli, (b) understand whether
or not there is a relationship between them, and (c) adapt the
response to the relationship or lack thereof (i.e., increasing the
frequency of the response or leaving it unchanged; Pierce and
Cheney, 2008; Catania, 2012). Such ability could not be dis-
counted as irrelevant in terms of consciousness as well as in terms
of adaptive responding (i.e., as evidence of the person dealing
appropriately/meaningfully with the environment and its stimu-
lation events; Spivey, 2007; Lancioni et al., 2010a; Monti, 2012;
Bagnato et al., 2013).
The use of the learning test, as applied in this study (i.e.,
based on operant principles), may be considered rather costly
in terms of time. In fact, it involves a relatively large number
of sessions, which require a substantial investment on the side of
staff personnel. While this observation cannot be downplayed,
two considerations might be made about it. First, it is possi-
ble that the learning test might be carried out successfully with
a smaller number of sessions for some participants, thus saving
relevant staff time. Second, one could view the sessions not only
as a costly assessment process but also as a positive stimulation
period totally in line with the reported needs of persons with
vegetative or minimally conscious state (Daveson, 2010; Lancioni
et al., 2010a; Hirschberg and Giacino, 2011; Lotze et al., 2011;
Di Stefano et al., 2012).
The use of stimuli such as light body massages (as done
with Ray) may raise additional questions about the cost of the
learning test based on operant principles. Indeed, those stim-
uli are to be administered by a staff person directly while the
stimuli normally used (e.g., video clips of songs and ﬁlms)
are presented automatically by the technology available for the
procedure. The reason for using body massages was the assump-
tion that they could have greater reinforcing/motivating value
than other stimuli (i.e., also in view of Ray’s presumed visual
and auditory impairment). The use of pleasant (motivating)
stimuli is undoubtedly critical to foster learning (Kazdin, 2001;
Pierce and Cheney, 2008).
The use of a learning test procedure with the related technology
for monitoring the participant’s responses (i.e., microswitches)
and providing him or her stimulation (i.e., computer system) may
be considered highly practical and functional also for rehabilita-
tion purposes. In fact, this procedure does not simply allow the
participant an increase in stimulation input (as it happens with
conventional stimulation programs; e.g., Lotze et al., 2011; Di Ste-
fano et al., 2012), but entitles him or her to play an active role
and control the stimulation (Lancioni et al., 2010a, 2012b). The
participant can determine, through the frequency of his or her
responding, how much stimulation to have. More speciﬁcally, the
participant can modify the response frequency in relation to his or
her general status/need and also in relation to the type of stimula-
tion available. Eventually, the participant may learn to use two or
more microswitches simultaneously so as to develop new adaptive
responses and choose between or among stimuli (Lancioni et al.,
2010b). These opportunities can be considered essential in terms
of activity engagement, self-determination, and basic communi-
cation (i.e., all critically beneﬁcial components of an intervention
program for these persons; Bosco et al., 2009; Lancioni et al.,
2009a; Lotze et al., 2011; Schabus et al., 2011).
In conclusion, this study has extended the evidence available
about the potential of a learning test based on operant prin-
ciples. This test (a) might be more sensitive than behavioral
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scales normally used with post-coma persons with severe dis-
orders of consciousness, and (b) can also serve as a functional
intervention strategy aimed at enhancing adaptive responding
and stimulation input, self-determination, and communication
(i.e., essential targets in the rehabilitation process; Lancioni
et al., 2010a). New research would need to extend the use of
the learning test to other individuals with disorders of con-
sciousness and compare the test outcome with the data of other
diagnostic strategies, including behavioral scales and neuro-
physiological techniques (Kennedy, 2005). These research efforts
could promote a better understanding of the employability,
strengths, and limits of the test. Research might also focus on
new responses and microswitches essential for applying the test
with persons with different characteristics (Memarian et al., 2011;
Lancioni et al., 2012a; Scherer, 2012).
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